As with all ordinary science, much is assumed, as the Introduction also demonstrates. 2 To large extent such mindlessness must be forgiven under the flag of Neurath's boat, which must be rebuilt even while it is at sea. 6 We cannot pay attention to everything at once, and if we seek to address something as nebulous as "culture" in financial regulation, assumptions are going to have to be made. But it should also be acknowledged that our assumptions also may be convenient, or otherwise intellectually dubious. So before we stride off into the rough of financial institution regulation, and what has or has not been learned from the global financial crisis, and what "culture" might mean, at least for the purposes of preventing or at least containing the fire next time, it is worth pausing to reflect on the fact that financial culture is not only, or even most importantly, the culture within financial industries, including of course their customers and regulators. That is, the most important part of financial culture may have very little to do with that on which we, as experts of one sort or another, are authorized to speak. "I'm sorry about the cancer, ma'am, but I'm a podiatrist."
Financial culture also is the product of financial industries; it is the heart of contemporary political economy, what I have elsewhere called the City of Gold. 7 The GFC matters in a way that, for example, the Silicon Valley bubble did not, not merely because of the former's scale, but because the mismanagement of financial institutions led to the disruption of so many human relationships, most obviously employment relationships. Unemployment --or lack of employment opportunities --blights a generation. Unemployment correlates with suicide, divorce, and addiction rates. 8 With massive unemployment (or worse, little employment prospects for the young, energetic, and sometimes violent) we may see a loss of faith in social institutions, a rise in ethnic animosity and virulent nationalism, an anarchist moment. "The best lack all conviction, while the worst/ Are full of passionate intensity," as Yeats has it. 9 This year, 2013, does not appear to be 1913, nor even 1933, though the situation in Southern Europe remains particularly dismaying. But to say that history teaches that things can be worse is a pathetic David A. Westbrook Culture of Financial Institutions; Institution of Political Economy February 18, 2013 Page 4 excuse. Members of the financial community (or at least its talking heads) tend to be all too blithe about recent colossal failures, and the harm that has been inflicted not only on "the little people," but also on the structures that sustain the lives of the privileged.
Understanding financial culture, and the failings of the global financial crisis, in social terms does more than to remind us of the human significance of events, significance that is perhaps easy to forget in technical discourses on institutional regulation. Indeed part of the point of this or any other expert discourse (consider here medicine, or the military) is to be able to discuss fraught questions, such as cancers, bombs, or indeed insolvencies, as if they were merely objective. And in recent years the discipline of economics has struggled to define itself in scientific terms, understood to be concerned with objects, and thus in some sense outside of culture and by extension politics. So, from an economic perspective, one may speak of, for familiar examples, the independence of central banking, or a "technical" government, or make the claim that while it is clear what reforms need to be made, the problems are political.
But from the more traditional and perhaps defensible perspective of political economy, finance is social in the structural sense used by sociologists and anthropologists. Our financial institutions are absolutely central to the way we as people conduct ourselves and understand our lives. This may be most obvious in the United States, where so many social goods, including much education, health care, and retirement, are provided through institutions directly dependent on portfolio investment. But as the European debt crisis makes clear, in countries where social obligations are met by the state, governments are quite dependent on healthy financial markets, in turn dependent on healthy "private" (!) financial institutions. Other examples abound. We securitize fixed assets. We pay for daily operations through credit arrangements, both as individuals (credit cards) and businesses (commercial lending and paper). As both individuals and especially institutions, we are comfortable with leverage, exchange rate risk, and all sorts of other dangers, in large part because we have developed derivative markets intended David A. Westbrook Culture of Financial Institutions; Institution of Political Economy February 18, 2013 Page 5 to hedge our risks. One could go on, but in short, we have capitalized our worlds --this is what it means to have a "social capitalism." 10 To put the matter differently: if the GFC represents a colossal failure of finance, it also demonstrates just how successful finance has been in monetizing contemporary economies, so that it seems rather quaint to talk about the distribution of goods and services and the problem of scarcity.
Thus while we still tend to teach finance in entrepreneurial terms (finance is progressive, because it allows people to do what they cannot do out of retained earnings), credit --sweet liquidity --is absolutely central to daily operations of leveraged (and interconnected, and vulnerable) governments, institutions and individuals. All of this makes the spectacle of young bucks at Barclays promising one another bottles of champagne in exchange for modest market manipulation 11 seem like a farce, but symptomatic --Marie Antoinette dressing up as a shepherd.
And this makes financial regulation an essentially custodial, or as is said in the banking context (now including the securities context) 12 "prudential," enterprise, like the provision of electricity or water.
At this point, the expert debate on the regulation of financial institutions does not seem so harmless. Without being sentimental, at issue is not merely how banks and other financial institutions are to be run, but our political economy, i.e., little questions like whether kids in Spain will ever get a job, or just how many people in the US will be on food stamps. It would be intellectually convenient to say, with Foucault, that our claims to expert knowledge are also assertions of authority, power. 13 While there is a truth here, this point is easily overdone: bureaucrats want to live comfortably, which requires a modicum of authority, but not power in the In policy discourse, culture is commonly approached in two basic ways, both centered on the notion of assessing the significance of an action vis-a-vis a social frame of reference, the "culture."
Lawyers tend to think of culture on the model of law, conceived of as a rule. As suggested above, however, we also could begin our inquiry into financial culture from the outside, rather than the inside, of financial institutions. We might begin by thinking about financial culture in terms of their artifacts, the products of financial institutions that we use every day, and that shape the way we live. In other words, we might think about financial culture in terms of political economy writ large, as that which financial institutions institute, make: our commercial society.
So how does finance work in the social world? For purposes of discussion, entertain the following proposition: the Occupy Wall Street movement considered (perhaps generously) as argument, was descriptively correct and normatively
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incorrect. That is, Occupy Wall Street was right to complain about the 1% (or better, less); substantial material inequality in fact inheres in contemporary market societies. Consider further the possibility that, despite regnant ideologies of autonomy and equality, our fundamental social structures cannot plausibly be discussed in those terms. To be blunt, Occupy Wall Street was normatively wrong to believe that our society --that any financial society, including proudly egalitarian
Nordic ones --is fundamentally about equality and autonomy.
Progress, as Henry Sumner Maine famously wrote, consisted in the historical movement from societies in which order was defined by status or birth, to societies in which order was defined by contract. 24 This is as succinct a definition of liberal modernity as one might wish, and its connections to commercial ideology are both visible to this day and well documented. 25 But suppose that finance does not work that way. Suppose that in moving from an economy of goods and services to an economy of money, and from the antithesis of capital and labor familiar since Marx to social capitalism, we have also moved from contract to status as the foundation of social order. Suppose we are neo-feudal, and have not yet awoken to our lives?
A full account, much less defense, of this idea would require a book that I may not write. Among other things, I find the idea unappealing, and the days are short.
So the rest of this essay may be considered maliciously suggestive, an ideological ghost story, at the very least a provocation. But if our society is inherently unequal, and that inequality is realized and enforced through financial institutions, surely the regulation of financial institutions ought to reflect that reality? More broadly, how might we think about political economy writ large after republican pieties have been washed away in a sea of liquidity, or, to put it more bluntly and in European terms, 
Page 11 example of travel. One sets out armed with a piece of plastic and sometimes a little book (for Americans, the book is blue). The traveler exhibits her tokens to people, generally "agents" of governments or corporations. If the tokens are found valid, the traveller is given airplane rides, hotel rooms, refreshments, and so forth. The traveler retains the plastic and the book, indeed, need not give anybody anything.
Instead of actual exchange, various accounts on various computers are changed, i.e.,
by "payment" we usually mean a communication and a promise to account. Thus travel and for that matter economic activities generally take place in "economies of money." 26 Virtually all of what is "exchanged" does not exist in any material sense.
"Exchange" has itself become a metaphor for essentially legal communication about the terms of financial instruments, promises to alter numbers which, like sports statistics, express relative standing. All that is solid melts into air, as it were. 27
One cannot think of communication (one cannot speak) outside of a culture.
Financial culture is the water in which we all swim, regulators and regulated and just plain folks. Finance itself is an expression and constitutive of culture; payment (contract, property, and so forth) is always already cultural. Thus the recent discovery of "culture" in financial discourse--as an afterthought, what to do when the rules fail to keep up with developments in the market --is wrongheaded. In the same vein, the imaginary of the lawyers and economists, for whom culture is understood is something to be confronted by actors, as rule or incentive, is misleading. Culture was always the question, and culture was always also internal to the individuals, institutions, modes of interaction that constitute financial markets.
If culture was always the question, then why has culture come to the fore just (Corporate lawyers universally do so.) That is, when a commercial culture is working, and especially when money is being made, the question of culture fades into the background. When a community's norms lead it to harm itself, culture comes into question.
So it is because these are hard times --because our financial thinking or at least policy failed to prevent disaster --that we must think anew about financial culture. We must reconsider whether we still believe what we long thought we know about financial culture, viz., is it really sensible to think about finance in terms of the trade of scarce resources, i.e., the exchange of goods, among equals? To shift examples slightly, assume that you "order" dinner, or better still, "command" it in French, and your credit card is accepted, that is, the waiter (or "server") and the kitchen obey your wishes. The restaurant and its staff accept that you are the sort of person to whom dinner should be brought. Unless you leave a tip in cash on the Page 13 looking out for the restaurant, which looks after its suppliers, its staff, and so forth.
From this perspective the credit card establishes the diner's social standing. Credit transactions are rather feudal, in the fairly literal sense of a web of obligations and obedience built upon trust.
There are, of course, other accounts to give of what it means to order dinner.
Those on the left would like to maintain that people get things, or should get things, because they have done some work. That would be nice, but let me be honest: I do not work much, and therefore do not assume that wealth is the artifact of labor.
More to the point, I do not work for the waiter, and what work I have done, he does not know. All he knows is I have plastic, and that is more than enough. Or, to turn the problem around, feudal lords "worked" too: they fought their kings wars, struggled with rivals, ran manors, and sired heirs. But it would be foolish to say that they were obeyed in exchange for their labors.
Those on the right sometimes maintain that capital markets, great engines of progress and security, require investors. Even though investors do not work, they bear risk, for which they should be paid. As a professor of finance, I teach this story, but again, I really do not risk much. I have tenure, and I hope I am not being let onto a plane to bear risk. In short, neither the ideology of the left nor the ideology of the right does a very good job of articulating what is happening in an ordinary financial transaction: on the basis of messages --in this case, swiping credit cards --agents are authorized, or not authorized to act.
As already suggested, this does not sit well with the liberal mind.
Conventionally, we imagine transactions as exchanges among contracting parties who are legally presumed to be equals. That is, we see economic activity as the expression of liberty, choice: one chooses to buy or sell. We speak of "free markets"
instead of "command economies" much less "neofeudal obligation. that a world of difference exists between being a "server" today and chattel slavery in the US in the early 19th century does not mean we should understand restaurant service in terms of autonomous exchange rather than, literally, service.
As noted, in economies of money, we see webs of obligation without direct exchange. We see service, indeed, obedience, even if not the right to physical coercion or outright alienation, as with chattel slavery. In "The Theory of the Firm,"
Ronald Coase was disturbed by the fact that so much economic activity was governed by hierarchies of command rather than by bargain, a price mechanism. 29 He argued that a system of contractual subservience saved transaction costs.
Perhaps, but this led Coase to the uneasy recognition that any economic system -- Much more may be said about the use of "transaction costs" to rescue the economic imaginary of autonomous and presumptively equal contracting parties, but more old fashioned and honest words are "privilege," "status," and even "class," A business attracts custom --depositors and other investors in a bank --based on a differentiated reputation, secured by the sorts of intellectual property that make up a brand. But investors generally do not "know" what "their" banks do.
As Jamie Dimon will admit, even bankers are pretty hazy on what their institutions are doing. 32 Investment is usually highly social, based on reputation and commonly held (hence publicly defensible) belief, and hence the need for credit rating agencies.
From this perspective, handing over a credit card is like showing a letter from the king, or wearing a uniform that displays an officer's rank. The credit card establishes a position vis-a-vis a chain of financial institutions, and by extension, the governments that attempt to back them up, not always successfully. None of this is very democratic, and in that sense not very modern, and therefore difficult to think, At least four differences between the regulatory demands of the social capitalism we in fact have and the orthodoxies of contemporary regulatory discourse (what both regulators and regulated say) are salient.
First, insofar as economic activity consists of communications that affect relative standing ("positions") among authoritative institutions, the public/private distinction is largely effaced. From the bottom up: webs of speech form the public sphere. The fact that speech is transactional does not somehow make it private.
(The agora is a public space.) From the top down, all of the actors are licensed, regulated, and generally insured by the government. To quip, all finance is more or 33 It is worth noting in passing that the supply of tokens is in principle infinite --limited by the willingness to participate (promise, bet, extend credit). But if supply is indefinitely large, is indeed positively associated with demand, then distribution under conditions of scarcity are hardly what financial markets, at least, are doing. This essay therefore could have focused not on the absence of exchange, but the political character of both supply and demand, and by extension, the social (cultural) qualities of price, none of which can easily be squared with liberal theology. As financial markets, especially derivative markets, become more important to how society operates, political economy should be revised accordingly. Third, and by extension from the first two points, the regulator and the object of regulation need to be understood in terms of one another, reciprocally rather than antagonistically. Here again the metaphor of sports is instructive. The referee does not exist without the game. Conversely, games cannot be won without a set of conventions to determine the bounds of the field, what counts as a point, and the like. To understand rules --and regulators, and ultimately law --as essentially external to marketplace activity is a common error, but an error nonetheless. It is legal instruments that are being traded, all the way down.
Fourth, regulators and policy makers and even academics are conceptually "within" the culture they seek to regulate. To some extent, this is a matter of biography --one must know a lot of finance even to follow the conversation. has strayed from the true law, and therefore must be overthrown, so that society may return to the path of righteousness (hence "revolution," a wheel returning to whence it began). 38 So we may assume that the financial regulation required by social capitalism will be, or should be, custodial in character.
As noted above, the social order has largely been capitalized --we rely on portfolio management to ensure the operation of our governments, our payment systems, the way institutions and individuals operate daily. We rely on endowments to provide social services, ranging from education to health care to California, 1986) . 40 As another aside, economics and so finance has not yet really taken the turn to interpretation that marks the rest of the social sciences and also the humanities.
Page 20 they are trying to regulate, yet which forms their own understanding of what it is that they regulate.
LIBOR itself is reflexive. The respondents are asked at what rate would your important bank be able to borrow a reasonable sum in a given currency for a specific tenor at 11:00 am? 41 In constructing LIBOR, the BBA, through Thompson
Reuters, asks bankers for their view of their place in the world, asks them to enact
Keynes's beauty pageant on themselves. 42 In speculating on the price at which a bank would be able to borrow a reasonable sum, the LIBOR respondent is forced to ask himself how ( Even then, one should try to remember, some folks always survive.
